By all appearances, cracks are beginning to show within the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the root of the unrest may lie at the very top of the civilian defense bureaucracy.
In a recent radio commentary by veteran broadcast journalist Deo Macalma, the undercurrent of dissatisfaction among the ranks of the military was laid bare. According to Macalma, there is growing restiveness in the AFP allegedly due to Defense Secretary Gilbert “Gibo” Teodoro Jr.’s inefficiency, questionable personnel decisions, and heavy-handed leadership style. While critics may be quick to dismiss this as political noise, Macalma’s observations gain traction in light of the recent local absentee voting (LAV) results: the Duterte-led opposition slate garnered overwhelming support from uniformed personnel in both the AFP and the Philippine National Police.

That alone should raise red flags for any serious policymaker.
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When the supposed non-partisan military bloc delivers a near-unanimous vote of protest—against the very administration they serve—something is fundamentally wrong.
The allegations surfacing from within the defense establishment are nothing short of troubling.
Reports of senior officers being relieved without due process, Board of Generals (BOG) recommendations being discarded or altered, and the elevation of allegedly unqualified officers with political connections reek of abuse and favoritism.

If true, these acts may constitute not just bad governance, but potential violations of Philippine law.
Under Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, several provisions appear relevant:
Section 3(e) prohibits giving unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality or evident bad faith—an accusation that could be applied to the alleged fast-tracking of promotions for allies of the Secretary.
Section 3(a) warns against persuading a superior (like the President) to sign off on decisions that run afoul of established procedures, such as bypassing BOG recommendations.
Section 3(c) raises even more serious concerns, especially with murmurs of contractors and “big-time dealers” frequenting AFP offices, implying a deeper rot that could involve procurement anomalies.
There are also violations of Republic Act No. 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials. Public servants are expected to act with professionalism, fairness, and integrity. If name-calling, divisiveness, and power tripping are the new norms at the DND, it sends a chilling message to the rest of the bureaucracy.
Furthermore, concerns about Secretary Teodoro overstepping his role are not merely administrative. If he is indeed acting outside the bounds of his authority—usurping powers constitutionally reserved for the Commander-in-Chief or the BOG—it could even rise to the level of usurpation of authority, a criminal offense under the Revised Penal Code.
It is crucial to stress that these are allegations, and due process must be observed. But ignoring the smoke signals now—especially when they are echoed by a veteran journalist like Macalma and amplified by actual voting behavior within the AFP and PNP—could lead to dangerous consequences for national stability.
The AFP is the last line of defense in any democracy. If its ranks are disillusioned, politicized, or demoralized, then the threat is not from without—but from within.
For the sake of national security, it is time Malacañang takes a hard look at the Department of National Defense, and ask: Is Secretary Gibo Teodoro still the right man for the job? Or has his leadership become a liability we can no longer afford?